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Indicators for Support for Economic Integration in Latin America
By: Will Humphrey
Abstract
Regionalism is a common phenomenon among many countries who share similar infrastructures,
economic climates, and developmental challenges. Latin America is no different and has experienced
the urge to economically integrate since World War II. Research literature suggests that public opinion
for economic integration can be a motivating factor in a country’s proclivity to integrate with others in
its geographic region. People may support integration based on their perception of other countries’
models or based on how much they feel their voice has political value. They may also fear it because
they do not trust outsiders and the mixing of societies that regionalism often entails. Using an ordered
probit model and data from the 2018 Latinobarómetro public opinion survey, I find that the desire for a
more alike society, opinion on the European Union, and the nature of democracy explain public support
for economic integration. Based on these results, Latin American policymakers should keep their
constituents in mind when weighing the costs and benefits of economic integration.
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Introduction
The globalized economy has driven many countries to regionalize. Regionalism, or more
specifically, economic regionalism, includes “institutional arrangements designed to facilitate the free
flow of goods and services and to coordinate foreign economic policies between countries in the same
geographic region” (Moon, 2016). Countries may regionalize into free-trade areas, customs unions,
economic unions, and common markets to increase the advantages of a broader economic network.
Through the years, regionalism has produced powerful economic blocs across six continents, such as the
European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Southern
Common Market (Mercosur) in Latin America. While economic regionalism traditionally occurs among
countries within smaller, more specific geographic regions, regionalist theorists have recently included
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) that span entire hemispheres in their definition of regionalism
(Börzel & Kim, 2017).
Why do countries regionalize?
Beyond the adage that two heads are better than one, there are several reasons why countries
regionalize. Börzel (2017) lists fours reasons why countries have grown towards regionalism: (1) because
it makes geographical sense, (2) to form alliances, (3) to promote economic development, and (4)
because globalization has pressured them to do so.
First, regionalism by definition means economic integration across a particular geographical
area. Countries close in proximity benefit from easier trade. Also, countries united by geography often
share similar cultures, customs, languages, and in the EU’s case, currency. According to Mansfield et al.
(2000), geographic proximity holds considerable weight in the tendency to regionalize, as it “increases

the intensity of economic exchange between countries,” which in turn solidifies regional cooperation
and integration.
Second, countries regionalize to form alliances. Outside threats often form regional blocs of
their own, so a regionalization attempt to counteract these threats is natural, according to Walt (1987).
Moreover, banding together is more powerful against economic and ideological threats than acting
alone or succumbing to what Walt (1987) calls the “bandwagon,” where countries regionalize around a
central sphere of influence. There have been several examples of this throughout history. NATO’s main
objective was to counterbalance Russian and German influences in Europe with those of the US (RisseKappen, 1995); and Brazil and Venezuela used Mercosur to weaken the US’s hand in Latin America
(Gomez Mera, 2005; Tussie, 2009).
Third, countries can economically benefit from regional integration because it provides a more
expansive market for economy activity. Free trade is a hallmark of economic advancement, and many
scholars hold it in great esteem, linking it to advances in foreign investment (Bruszt & Palestini, 2016).
Proponents of regionalism also cite the Stolper-Samuelson and Heckscher-Ohlin theories as evidence
that free trade will provide countries with greater relative advantage in the factors of production (e.g.
Fordham, 2008; Milner & Tingley, 2011; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). Börzel (2016) reiterates that
economic integration fosters economic and industrial development in addition to social protection.
Regional integration occurs with regional commonalities at its heart, so all countries within an economic
zone will feel its benefits.
Finally, and most importantly, globalization has led more countries to regionalize than ever
before. Technological advancement occurs in step with globalization, which brings countries toward
economic interdependence. As a “major driver” for regionalism (Börzel, 2016), globalization increases
access to world markets, intensifies trans-border mobility, and mitigates the burden of trade issues

(Breslin et al., 2002; Schirm, 2002). In Latin America, however, regionalism has been used to combat
globalization. Mecham (2003)’s study on Mercosur identifies globalization as both an opportunity and a
challenge. Formed in 1991 to drive “economic development with social justice,” Mercosur was a political
alliance to bring countries together, a response to globalization, and a defense against American
hegemony (Mecham, 2003). Globalization was an opportunity for many lower income South American
countries to join the global economy, but economic integration by itself was the challenge. Mercosur
was the answer to this challenge. Chief among Mercosur’s critiques, however, is its inability to lessen
gross inequalities in Latin America (Mecham, 2003). Latin America bears the highest rates of inequality
in the world, along with its poverty, violence, crime, and corruption issues (Graham & Sukhtankar,
2004). Mercosur was thought to have been able to address these developmental issues, but instead
“[made] the poor work for globalization” (Mecham, 2003). At its heart, however, Mercosur is a case
study for Börzel’s reasons why countries regionalize.
Why Public Opinion is Important for Regionalism
Whether the public realizes it or not, regionalism promises economic benefits for a country.
Other than the four general benefits mentioned earlier, there are several direct benefits made evident
by the European Union’s example: currency unification, free trade areas, easier travel, greater business
efficiency and increased competition, and labor mobility. Moreover, support for economic integration
stems from certain perceived “pocketbook issues” that the public expects regionalism to soften
(Seligson, 1999). In fact, personal economic expectation has been found to be a major predictor of
public support for regional integration in many contexts, but primarily in the EU (Eichenberg & Dalton,
1993).
Nonetheless, public opinion is a relevant factor for economic integration in democratic states.
Public opinion has historically been most focused on domestic policy matters, but foreign policy has

drawn increasing attention (Seligson, 1999). Democratic states acting on the interests of their
constituents will conduct policies according to public desire. Today, public opinion is a chief mechanism
for holding national leaders accountable, and a more democratic society will have substantial influence
in its nation’s foreign affairs (Foyle, 2004; Onuki et al., 2016; Sobel 2001). Additionally, foreign policy has
increasingly become a hot topic in national elections and debates (see Holsti, 1992), and this interest has
magnetized research toward the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy (Faria, 2008).
Regionalism in Latin America
Mecham (2003) describes regionalism as a “development imperative” for Latin America in the
dawn of globalization after World War II. Ensuing regional projects—Mercosur, the Andean Community,
etc.—formed in response to the challenges posed by the war’s invitation for globalization. Regional
integration would be the strongest front against foreign aggression, should it happen again. These
economic blocs unified Latin American countries and, despite some integration attempts failing through
the years, were instrumental for development (Mecham, 2003; Seligson, 1999).
Public support for Latin American economic integration was initially very high but has dwindled
in recent years (Deutschmann & Minkus, 2018). Recent political shifts to the left (pink tide) have
strongly influenced public support for regional integration in Latin America. Considering this background
on regionalism in Latin America, this paper will investigate three potentially influential factors in public
support for economic integration in Latin America: xenophobic sentiment, the European model, and
perception of democracy. Section II will review relevant literature on these themes; sections III and IV
will discuss the data and methodology; sections V and VI will present results and a discussion; and
section VII will conclude.

Literature Review
While literature on regionalism is expansive and tackles several facets of integration across the
globe, studies investigating the relationship between public opinion and economic integration,
especially in Latin America, are few. However, three key themes identified among exploratory empirical
work on public support for economic integration are useful for this paper: a desire for a more
homogeneous society, perceptions about the EU, and democracy.
Citizens’ attitudes toward minorities and outsiders are extremely relevant for overall opinion on
economic integration. The literature reveals two ways that fear of outside influence shapes public
opinion on economic integration. The first deals with the fear of entangling societies as a reason against
integration, and the second the most visible in Latin American cases supports integration for fear of
outside influence. First, because regionalism unifies countries into one bloc, it is not only possible but
also common that societies mix, facilitated by labor mobility and free trade areas (Schlipphak, 2015).
The want for a homogeneous society, stemming from xenophobic fears that immigrants will pose a
threat to the culture, values, economy, and safety of said society, has been shown to be influential in
estimating public support for economic integration, although economic integration occurs in spite of
cultural differences. Mansfield and Mutz (2009) found that opinions against foreigners were significant
factors in lowering support for free trade. In their study, they test the Heckscher-Ohlin model and
preferences for free trade and find that citizens will act in their own interest when supporting free trade.
This would not be the case in Latin America because many countries are similar in culture, language, and
developmental background.
Second, outside actors or third parties strongly affect how citizens view regional integration
(Davis (1998) in Mexico; Genna (2009) in Europe; and Jhee (2009) & Kwon (2010) in Asia). For example,
although the US has had its hands in Latin American affairs for decades, many Latin American leaders

are skeptical of its influence in the region (Schlipphak, 2015). In his book on anti-Americanism in Latin
America, McPherson (2006) shows how public opinion for integration often stems from elites’ rhetoric
portraying the US in a negative light. Therefore, Schlipphak (2015) posits that Latin Americans wary of a
meddlesome US would support regional integration as a “stronghold against US interests.”
Börzel (2016) also discusses whether social attitudes for a homogeneous society are a
precondition or an indicator for regional integration. In the EU, a homogeneous society breeds shared
norms and values, but many are still skeptical of its ability to maintain an identity that is uniquely and
holistically European (Risse, 2010). Europe possesses strong societal bonds that facilitate unified
institutions. Similarly, Latin America benefits from strong cultural bonds, but it warrants questioning
whether different political systems and interest in regional institutions will be able to support economic
integration (Acharya & Johnston, 2007). These factors hold tremendous weight in shaping public opinion
for economic integration in Latin America. While disapproving of integration for fear of mixing societal
norms is a valid factor, in Latin America the fear of outside threat is a stronger predictor for integration
support.
Next, literature related to European successes with regionalism has been the topic of an array of
studies, starting with Ronald Inglehart (Schlipphak, 2015). Inglehart and others’ research focuses on the
European Union and its citizens’ attitudes on identity and integration (Duch & Taylor 1997; Gabel 1998;
Inglehart 1970, 1971). These studies depict public opinion as extremely influential for European
integration. As Europe has been a success story in durable integration, it is likely that other countries will
look to it as an example and follow suit. Seligson (1999) maintains that Latin Americans, inspired by
Europe, have experimented with economic integration through the years. Latin Americans pay attention
to Europe, and those who view European affairs favorably are likely to support economic integration in
Latin America (Seligson, 1999). Buelvas (2013) also discusses ways that Latin American states have used

the EU as a model for this “advance and retreat” regionalism, in which there have been several attempts
to integrate with few lasting successes. By recognizing European society as beneficial, Latin Americans
will likely support economic integration.
Finally, democracy opens the door for public support for economic integration due to increased
trust in elected government officials, who will hold citizens’ interests at the forefront of their political
actions (Davis & Bartilow, 2007; Schlipphak, 2015; Seligson, 1999). According to regionalist theory,
liberal democracies and advanced market economies are havens for regionalism to flourish (Börzel,
2016). Also, Haas (1961) and Haas and Schmitter (1964) suggest that more authoritarian countries with
low levels of market activity are not conducive to social interest in integration.
Moreover, citizens’ perceived benefits from economic integration will also predict their support
for it. Citizens viewing their countries as more democratic will support economic integration more than
those in less democratic states, as shown in Tucker et al. (2002), Machida (2009), and Herzog and Tucker
(2010). In Latin America, Baker (2003) showed that trade policy preferences among the public are
derivative of consumption practices. Stretching this finding to the context of this paper, one can infer
that a society viewing free trade areas as beneficial for its spending practices will likely support
economic integration. But what does free trade have to do with democracy? Numerous studies
dedicated to this relationship have shown that democratization runs in tandem with globalization and
facilitates free trade (e.g. Erikson et al., 2009; Freedom House, 2015; Milner & Kubota, 2005).
Additionally, public opinion in democracies is very influential for domestic issues, and has been
shown to be growing in importance for foreign issues, as well (Seligson, 1999). An example of this is the
Maastricht Treaty to further economic integration in Europe, which was at first rejected by Danish
voters in a 1992 referendum (Nohlen & Stöver, 2010). This was considered a setback for European
integration (Seligson, 1999). In this example, public opinion towards economic integration determined

integration in a democratic way. In some instances, integration is also a measure to “lock in” democracy
or otherwise preserve sovereignty amid regionalism (Levistsky & Way, 2010; Söderbaum, 2005). In fact,
empirically testing the relationship through logistic regression, Seligson (1999) found a statistically
significant (p<0.001) relationship between satisfaction with democracy and favor for economic
integration.
Literature dedicated to demographic factors, such as income and education (which will serve as
controls for this paper), has held that those with more education and those in higher income brackets
will support economic integration because they recognize its benefits. Those with higher degrees of
education will have positive attitudes toward economic integration, especially in developing countries
(Edwards 2009; Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006). Regarding NAFTA, Davis (1998) found that education
shapes Mexicans’ attitudes concerning the agreement, because they make certain economic
calculations about its benefits to society (see also Davis & Bartilow, 2007; Seligson, 1999). European
studies have also found strong correlations between education and positive views on economic
integration in Europe (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001), and when studies such as Magaloni and Romero
(2008) expanded this research into Latin America, they found similar results. Börzel (2016) also notes
how education and income influence public opinion. These factors include the expected benefits of
regional free trade: lowered transaction costs, policy externalities, economies of scale, technological
innovation, foreign investment, and greater political and economic pull in international settings.
Regarding income, besides bringing economic prosperity through liberalized trade, economic
integration allows for higher wages in some instances. Wealthier people are hypothesized to favor
economic integration, because they are generally highly educated and highly skilled. Interestingly,
Seligson (1999) found that those with less education and those in lower income brackets did not have an
opinion on economic integration whatsoever. Seligson (1999) also includes one other variable related to

income, remittances, because those receiving remittances are more likely to be knowledgeable of
foreign affairs and/or know that certain regional organizations exist (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Sartori,
2003).
Overall, research supports the hypotheses that foreign mistrust, EU opinion, and democracy
impact one’s opinion on economic integration. This study will follow methodology derived from Seligson
(1999) to estimate the likelihood of supporting economic integration in Latin America. This paper builds
on the research in two ways. First, it harmonizes the existing literature into one study by assessing the
impact of these three factors alone and then by integrating them into one full model. Second, using data
from the 2017 Latinbarómetro survey, it will expose people’s most recent views on economic
integration in light of several protectionist practices from countries around the world, mainly the US and
China.
Data and Methodology
Data
The data for this study comes from the 2017 Latinobarómetro Public Opinion Poll administered
by the Latinobarómetro Corporation in Santiago, Chile. The sample includes 20,200 observations among
individuals ages 18 and older (16 and older in Nicaragua and Brazil) from the 18 countries surveyed. In
most countries, each sample includes 1,200 individuals, but in the Central American countries and in the
Dominican Republic, the sample size is 1,000 individuals. The dataset allows use of probabilistic weights
to make each country’s sample size nationally representative. Appendix 1 shows the countries covered
and their sample sizes.
The dependent variable for analysis concerns one’s favor of economic integration in their
respective country. The survey question asks respondents to answer: Are you very much in favor,

somewhat in favor, somewhat against, or are you very much against economic integration with other
countries? Responses to this variable have been inverted so that a higher rank means more in favor of
economic integration.
There are three explanatory variables included in this study. They include one signaling the wish
for a more homogeneous society (Which of the following statements is closest to your way of thinking?
0. “It is better for us if society is society is composed of people from different nationalities, religions, and
cultures,” or 1. “It is better for us if society is composed of people from the same nationality with the
same religion and culture.”). Another variable asks one’s opinion on the European Union (Do you have a
very good, good, bad, or very bad opinion of [the European Union]?”). Finally, a third variable asks the
respondent to rank how democratic or undemocratic their country is (“0 means completely
undemocratic and 10 means completely democratic. How would you rank [country]?”).
The econometric analysis will use the following variables as control variables: age and age
squared; a dummy for whether the respondent is working as an independent or salaried professional; a
dummy for female; categorical variables for whether the respondent achieved no education, a high
school education, or a college education; a dummy for married; a categorical variable for political
attentiveness; and an index of household characteristics and goods titled wealth created by principal
component analysis (PCA, see Filmer & Scott, 2011). Research suggests that using wealth in lieu of
income creates a better proxy for socioeconomic inequality and household stability in Latin America,
because a significant portion of the population works informally with income fluctuating over short
periods of time (Arias et al., 2010; Levy, 2008). The scale representing wealth includes yes/no questions
that indicate number of bedrooms per house, home ownership, hot water in home, vehicle, telephone,
etc. To ease interpretation, I normalized the variable to be bound by [0, 1]. Table 1 includes summary

statistics as well as correlations for these variables. Each variable has a low variance inflation factor
(VIF), indicating little evidence for multicollinearity.
Methodology
First, while this study will examine factors affecting one’s attitude toward economic integration
in Latin American countries, one cannot discount respondents’ non-opinions. If few Latin Americans had
an opinion on economic integration, then the results of this paper would be severely skewed. Therefore,
I first run a logistic regression to find the odds ratios of not having an opinion (INTEG=0) on economic
integration, given socioeconomic and demographic control variables (Seligson, 1999).
Next, given the nature of the dependent variable—one’s support for economic integration—the ordered
probit model fits best. Because the question makes use of a Likert scale (Likert, 1932), the ordered
probit model allows the outcome to fit the data by preserving the response of the options without
assuming the distance between them, and assumes a standard normal distribution (Liddell & Kruschke,
2018). Three ordered probit tests are used to estimate the maximum likelihood of being in favor of
economic integration.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min.

Max.

Obs.

Integ

2.84

1.10

0

4

20,200

Homog

0.96

0.2

0

1

20,200

1.03

EU

2.25

1.39

0

4

20,200

1.08

Democracy

5.20

2.89

0

10

20,200

1.01

Female

0.52

0.50

0

1

20,200

1.08

Education

1.02

0.40

0

2

20,200

1.05

Professional

0.37

0.48

0

1

20,200

1.06

Variable

VIF

Married

0.53

0.50

0

1

20,200

1.01

Wealth

0.73

0.44

0

1

20,200

1.00

Pol. Attent.

0.19

0.39

0

1

20,200

1.04

Correlation Matrix
Integ.
Integ.

Homog.

EU

Democ.

Female

Educ.

Profess.

Married

Wealth

Pol.
Attent

1

Homog.

0.17

1

EU

0.27

0.14

1

Democ.

0.13

0.07

0.09

1

Female

-0.10

-0.04

-0.15

-0.03

1

Educ.

0.16

0.07

0.15

0.05

-0.01

1

Profess.

0.07

0.01

0.06

0.02

-0.22

0.02

1

Married

0.00

-0.00

-0.02

-0.01

-0.01

-0.00

0.05

1

Wealth

0.04

0.01

0.03

0.00

-0.05

0.04

-0.00

-0.01

1

Pol. Attent

0.09

0.03

0.12

0.01

-0.01

0.15

0.01

-0.05

0.00

The three hypotheses are as follows:
H1: One’s desire for a homogeneous society will have a positive effect on their support for economic
integration: respondents who think it is better for society to be composed of people from similar
backgrounds, religions, languages, and cultures.
H2: One’s favorability towards the European Union will have a positive effect on their support for
economic integration: those who have higher opinions of the EU will favor economic integration.

1

H3: One’s perception of democracy in their country will have a positive effect on their support for
economic integration: those view their country as more democratic (=10) will also favor economic
integration.
I examine these three hypotheses by estimating the following ordered probit model:
Pr(𝑌 = 𝑖|X) = Pr(𝐶𝑖 − 1 <  β0 +  β1 Xi +  β2 AGE +  β3 EDUCATION +  β4 PROFESSIONAL +
β5 MARRIED +  β6 WEALTH +  β7 POLATTENT +  ϵi <  𝐶𝑖 )

(1)

In Equation 1, Xi refers to each of the three main explanatory variables, HOMOG, EU, and DEMOCRACY
used to estimate the equation, and Ci refers to the cut points between responses.
Results
Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents in each country that did not have an opinion on
economic integration. For the sample as a whole, only 7 percent did not have an opinion for or against
Latin American economic integration.
Fig. 1: Non-opinion on economic integration in Latin America

With no opinion (%)

ECU, 2.67
DOM, 2.70
COL, 2.92
ARG, 4.17
URY, 4.50
HND, 5.30
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PER, 7.67
PAN, 7.70
CHL, 8.33
CRI, 8.40
NIC, 10.70
PAR, 10.75
GTM, 11.80
BRA, 15.25
0.00

2.00

4.00

6.00

Source: Latinobarómetro 2017
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Many European studies have also found certain predictors of non-opinion (Seligson, 1999).
These characteristics are individuals’ socioeconomic and demographic factors, as well as attentiveness
to the world around them. Tying these factors to Latin America, they include age, sex, years of
education, wealth, social class, and political attentiveness (see Table 1). Specifically, those who are
female and those who are older are statistically less likely to hold an opinion, while those who are more
politically attentive, younger, more educated, and of higher self-reported social class are significantly
more likely to hold an opinion.
Table 1: Predictors of non-opinion: logistic regression results
Variable

OR

β

S.E.

Political Attentiveness

0.7143

-0.3364

0.123**

Age

1.0003

-0.0108

0.011*

Female

1.9677

0.6769

0.063**

Education

0.8913

-0.1151

0.010**

Self-reported social class

0.6717

-0.3979

0.044**

Wealtha

0.8864

-0.1206

0.366

Constant

0.5161

-0.6615

0.527

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; a. Wealth measured by a 12-item index of ownership of various household
characteristics: parents have separate bedroom from children, own home, computer, washing machine,
fixed telephone, mobile phone, car, hot water, sewage system, at least one meal a day, drinking water,
smartphone.

Table 2 presents the results of each estimation. Column 1 displays the effect of wanting a
homogeneous society on support for regional economic integration, Column 2, support for the EU’s
effect, and Column 3, perception of democracy’s effect. Column 4 displays the full model, including all of
these explanatory variables. The results are consistent with the three hypotheses in Section III. All cases
reject the null hypothesis that the explanatory variable has no effect on support for economic

integration in Latin America. Respondents who favor a society formed of people similar to themselves
are more supportive of economic integration, as are those who favor the European Union and those
who consider their country more democratic. Other significant indicators with positive relationships to
support include one’s education, wealth, working as a professional, and political attentiveness. These
are all consistent with Seligson (1999), showing that predictors of economic integration in Latin America
have not changed with the turn of the century onward. Also consistent is the female variable. In Table 2,
(Column 4), those who are female are less likely to support economic integration. Comparing this result
to the odds ratios that women even have an opinion of economic integration, one can conclude that
their likelihood of supporting economic integration stems from even having an opinion at all.

Table 2: Ordered Probit Results—Determinants of Support for Economic Integration
(1)
HOMOG

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.73

0.58

(0.06)**

(0.06)**

EU
Very Bad

Bad

Good

Very Good

0.20

0.16

(0.08)*

(0.08)*

0.31

0.26

(0.04)**

(0.04)**

0.51

0.46

(0.03)**

(0.03)**

0.80

0.75

(0.05)**

(0.05)**

DEMOCRACY

Age

0.00

0.00

0.04

0.03

(0.001)**

(0.00)**

0.00

0.00

Age2

Female

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.00

-0.00

-0.00

-0.00

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.00)

-0.20

-0.14

-0.21

-0.14

(0.02)**

(0.02)**

(0.02)**

(0.02)**

0.31

0.28

0.32

0.25

(0.04)**

(0.04)**

(0.04)**

(0.04)**

0.69

0.58

0.71

0.54

(0.06)**

(0.06)**

(0.06)**

(0.05)**

0.09

0.083

0.08

0.08

(0.02)**

(0.02)**

(0.02)**

(0.02)**

-0.00

0.01

-0.00

0.01

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

0.07

0.06

0.08

0.06

(0.03)**

(0.03)*

(0.03)**

(0.02)*

0.22

0.17

0.22

0.17

(0.03)**

(0.03)**

(0.03)**

(0.03)**

-0.41

-0.72

-0.84

-0.05

(0.11)**

(0.10)**

(0.10)**

(0.11)

-0.08

-0.38

-0.51

0.30

(0.10)

(0.09)**

(0.10)**

(0.11)**

0.36

0.07

-0.08

0.76

(0.10)**

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.10)**

1.72

1.45

1.28

2.15

(0.10)**

(0.09)**

(0.09)**

(0.11)**

20,200

20,200

20,200

20,200

Education
High School

College

Professional

Married

Wealth

Pol. Attent.

Cut 1

Cut 2

Cut 3

Cut 4

N

Quantitative Effects
Table 3 shows the marginal effects of each variable on each ordered response to economic
integration in Latin America from Table 2 (Column 4). The marginal effect of the desire for a like-minded
society on the probability that one is very against economic integration (y=1) is equal to -0.04, while the
marginal effect for being very supportive (y=4) increases by 0.18. In all primary explanatory variables,
the marginal effect increases between y=1 and y=4. The control variables yield similar results to the
outcomes of Table 2, where more wealth, education, being a professional, and being more politically
attentive increase the probability that one supports economic integration. Interestingly, the marginal
effects produce a significant result for the age variable. The probability one has no opinion (y=0) or is
very against (y=1) economic integration is negative as age increases but becomes strongly positive (y=4)
as age increases.
Table 3: Marginal Effect of Independent Variables (using Model 4, Table 2)
No Opinion

Very Against

Somewhat
Against

Somewhat
Supportive

Very
Supportive

Pr(y = 0)

Pr(y = 1)

Pr(y = 2)

Pr(y=3)

Pr(y=4)

HOMOG

-0.07**

-0.04**

-0.05**

-0.01**

0.18**

EU

-0.03**

-0.01**

-0.02**

-0.00**

0.05**

DEMOCRACY

-0.00**

-0.00**

-0.00**

-0.00**

0.01**

Age

-0.00*

-0.00*

-0.00*

-0.00*

0.00*

Female

0.02**

0.01**

0.01**

0.00**

-0.04**

Education

-0.04**

-0.02**

-0.03**

-0.01*

0.08**

Professional

-0.01**

-0.01**

-0.01**

-0.00*

0.03**

Married

-0.00

-0.00

-0.00

-0.00

0.00

Wealth

-0.01*

-0.00**

-0.01**

-0.00

0.02*

Political Attent.

-0.02**

-0.01**

-0.02**

-0.00**

0.05**

dy/dx

* p<0.05; **p<0.01

Discussion & Policy Implications
This paper presents factors that influence public opinion on economic integration in Latin
America. The three variables that are linked to public opinion on economic integration are one’s desire
for a homogeneous society, opinion on the European Union, and perception of his or her country’s level
of democracy.
Those who favor a more homogeneous society are more likely to be highly supportive of
economic integration than those who wish for a mixed society. This finding is consistent with Mansfield
and Mutz (2009) and Schlippak (2015). Regional integration occurs among countries in proximity to one
another, and in Latin America these countries possess many similarities. Therefore, it follows that Latin
Americans would favor such economic intermingling among similar countries. Policies taking advantage
of this favor can aim to provide regional economic support and create more free trade areas or
preferential trade agreements.
The results for opinion about the EU signal that Latin Americans do pay attention to Europe.
Because a higher opinion of the EU increases favor for economic integration in Latin America, the EU
serves as a model for Latin American integration. This was true in Mercosur’s case and strengthens
findings by Inglehart (1970), Dutch and Taylor (1997), and Buelvas (2013). Economic integration policies
can use the EU as a point of reference when designing implementations. However, it should be noted
that Europe does not provide the same geographical, institutional, or economic structure as Latin
America, so policies should cater to Latin America’s ability to integrate among unique, pre-existing
connections.

Perceptions of democracy are also prominent indicators of support for economic integration in
Latin America. Those who feel their country is more democratic have a higher probability of supporting
economic integration than those who believe their country to be undemocratic. Individuals who feel as
though their voices matter in their country are likely to support economic integration, as they trust that
their country will bear societal interest in mind when negotiating terms of integration. These findings
parallel those of Seligson (1999) and Börzel (2016), who discuss democracy’s importance for public
opinion on economic integration.
Finally, and overarchingly, foreign policy related to regionalism should default to public opinion.
National executives acting in their own interests in matters of foreign policy will bear the brunt of public
disfavor if their policies go awry. To prevent public backlash, policymakers can design policy with
societal needs as criteria for choosing among alternatives.
Limitations that exist in this study include the typical limitations when dealing with survey data
(bias from question interpretation, social desirability bias) combined with the loose nature of opinion.
Furthermore, the Latinobarómetro survey design promises a nationally representative survey, but its
respondent-selection system pulls relatively few individuals from each primary sampling unit. This could
endanger the holistic interpretation of survey responses, even when employing sampling weights. This
in turn threatens external validity, as what may be true for the sample of individuals from Latin America
may not be true for other world regions.
Conclusion
This paper used an ordered probit model to test the relationship between people’s opinion on
economic integration and their desire for an alike society, opinion on the EU, and democratic nature of
their respective countries. The results indicate a significant link between the explanatory variables and
public opinion on Latin American economic integration. There appears to be a positive relationship

between these factors and the probability of being very supportive of economic regionalism.
Policymakers should keep societal needs and pressures in mind when considering criteria, selecting
policy options, and designing implementation strategies.
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Appendix 1: Countries Sampled by Latinobarómetro (2017)

Country

Observations

Argentina

1,200

Bolivia

1,200

Brazil

1,200

Chile

1,200

Colombia

1,200

Costa Rica

1,000

Dominican Republic

1,000

Ecuador

1,200

El Salvador

1,000

Guatemala

1,000

Honduras

1,000

Mexico

1,200

Nicaragua

1,000

Panama

1,000

Paraguay

1,200

Peru

1,200

Uruguay

1,200

Venezuela

1,200

